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EU STRUCTURAL AND COHESION FUNDS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL:  
IS REGIONAL AND NATIONAL INEQUALITY INCREASING?  
 
 
 
    
Introduction 
During the early years of the European Community (EC), policymakers envisioned a European 
model guided by a fundamental goal: to create an even closer union among the people of Europe.  
After hundreds of years of failed attempts to integrate Europe, the terrible consequences of both 
World Wars gave rise to a new phase in the European political scene.  From this point on, the 
European countries and their respective leaders have been integrating their national economies 
and policies through the establishment of treaties and through intra-national agreements.   
 
By the end of the 1940’s, many European countries had been ruled by a dictator, suffered 
a fascist regime, or occupied by a foreign army.  As a direct result of such failures, tens of 
millions of Europeans died at the hands of fellow Europeans. The economy was in ruin as the 
war destroyed infrastructures, factories, houses, and farms.  The post-war restructuring process 
from the late 1940’s to the mid 1950’s was set forth to radically transform Europe’s economy, as 
well as its political system.  
 
Europeans realized their continent could not bear the consequences of another war.   
Treaties and policies were set forth to avoid this unwanted outcome.  The first efforts to unify 
Europe were spurred by political grounds and had the full support of the United States, who 
wanted to create an allied western coalition in response to the threat imposed by the communist 
bloc.  After some early treaties such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS) in 1952, 
and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in 1958, European leaders realized 
the economic gains of a common bloc.  From that point on, the European integration process has 
been driven by political and economic goals.  In particular, the preambles of the Treaties of 
Rome (1957) established the need to reduce the existing differences between the various regions.  
In order to meet these objectives the Community created the European Social Fund (ESF), the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) in 1958, and the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975.  
 
The harmonization process was strengthened by the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 
and the Maastricht treaty in 1992, which was ratified in 1993. The SEA designed the basis for a 
genuine cohesion policy with new articles on “economic and social cohesion” in order to develop 
a strategy of redistribution.  Cohesion is not defined in the Treaty, however Article 158 of the 
Treaty makes it clear that cohesion requires, ‘in particular’, the reduction of disparities between 
the levels of development of the various regions. Six years later, the Maastricht treaty established 
“cohesion” as one of the main objectives of the Union and created the Cohesion Fund to support 
projects in the fields of environment and transport among the least prosperous members.  The 
Structural Funds have, since the mid 1980’s, provided the main instruments for promoting 
cohesion in the European continent.   
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In 1993, the Edinburgh European Council decided to allocate one third of the Community 
budget to cohesion policy and established a Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG).  
In line with these developments, the budget was progressively modified to meet the increasing 
monetary demands.  During the early years the budget was financed by three components: 
agricultural levies, customs duties, and a proportion of the base used for assessing value added 
tax in the Member States. In 1987 a fourth component was added after the ratification of the 
SEA, which began to relate contributions to capacity to pay.  The capacity to pay was based on 
relative GNP figures for the member countries so that countries with a high GNP contributed 
more than those with a lower GNP.  Once this fourth component was put into operation, the 
cohesion policy became a true mechanism of redistribution that created net contributors, the 
richer countries, and net recipients, the poorer countries.  Even though the size of the European 
Union (EU) budget was and remains small in relation to the gross national product (GNP) of all 
member states, it is very important to those who receive extensive transfers since it operates as a 
multiplier effect on the economic and social factors likely to stimulate a region’s economy. 
 
Regional disparities in the EU and in the member states have always been regarded as 
barriers to what the original Treaty of Rome termed ‘harmonious development’, and to the 
cohesion policy established in the SEA.  The Structural Funds are the mechanism through which 
the EU has tried to reduce inequalities across nations and regions in the last twenty years. The 
main objective of the funds is to reduce the disparities by redistributing resources according to 
four principles: (i) additionality, (ii) partnership, (iii) programming, and (iv) concentration; and 
seven objectives: (a) promoting development and structural adjustment in regions lagging 
behind, (b) aiding the conversion of regions in industrial decline, (c) combating long term 
unemployment and social exclusion, (d) promoting equal opportunities for men and women, (e) 
facilitating the adaptation of workers to industrial change, (f) promoting rural development and 
promoting development and (g) structural adjustment of regions with low population density.
1 
  
In 1988 the European institutions implemented important reforms.  These reforms 
doubled the amount of funding allocated to the three Structural Funds in 1988 over the 1988-
1993 period and in addition they stipulated that integration should take the form of ‘operating 
programs’ rather than the ‘project by project’ approach.  This created the drafting of multi-year 
Regional Development Plans (RDP’s) as a pre-requisite before the Community funds were 
allocated.  The programming period for the RDP’s is a five-year term period.  Eligible member 
states produce and submit the RDPs to the Commission who thereafter revises and negotiates the 
plans with the Member States.  The final version of the development plan includes the forms of 
intervention and the financial details, such as the amount of co-payment that each contracting 
party (pubic and private) has pledged.  Each party is therefore legally bound to provide the 
financial contribution according to their commitment.  This final document is called the 
Community Support Framework (CSF).   
  
Reducing inequality among member states was a priority for the EU. As a result, the 
Maastricht Treaty (1993) upgraded the importance of regional policy by making economic and 
social cohesion one of the three pillars of the community reforms between 1994-1999, increasing 
the programming period from five to six years.  Structural programming was made more flexible 
- member states had the option to assume a two-stage rather than the three-stage implementation 
                                                 
1 See Delors (1989) for further details.  
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process.  Under the new approach, each member state could draw up a RDP which included 
specific economic programs.  The negotiations with the Commission produced the CSF which 
established the Single Programming Documents (SPDs).  The end result allowed member states 
to develop detailed plans rather than general statements thus leaving the Commission with less 
room for maneuver. 
 
The 1988 reforms merged the ERDF, the ESF, and the EAGGF under the label of 
‘cohesion policy’. For the 1989-93 periods, funding came from these three funds, and five 
objectives were assigned to the Structural Funds (see Appendix - A). For the 1989-1993 
programming period, a fourth and a fifth fund - the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance 
(FIFG), and the Cohesion Fund (see Appendix - A) - were added. There was a sixth objective 
appended to the existing five (see Appendix - A). 
 
Finally, the last financial program devoted to curve inequality is the Cohesion Fund (CF), 
established in 1993 after the Maastricht treaty was ratified.  This fund provided financial 
assistance to particular projects of the member states - as opposed to the regions – with a GDP 
per capita below 90 per cent of the Community average.  The main purpose of the CF was to 
facilitate the budgetary discipline required by the Treaty for the poorer countries – Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain.  Only countries which are in line with the economic convergence to 
the monetary union are eligible.  The CF provides two kinds of financial support: public or 
private investment projects.  As we can see, reducing inequality among member states while 
curving disparities among regions of recipient states is one of the most important goals of the 
assistance funds. 
 
There has been a long standing tradition within Europe that has been driven by political 
and economic considerations to reduce inequality and achieve convergence within Member 
States. To implement the “structural adjustment polices”, the attention of the Community 
officials has been devoted to a relatively small number of “development indicators”: (i) 
transportation, telecommunication and water supply, (ii) highly qualified labor force and high 
school attendance rate, (iii) the financial system and (iv) research and development activities.
2  
The objective of this paper is to determine the effectiveness of the assistance funds in reducing 
economic inequality in the Iberian Peninsula. More specifically, to empirically capture how 
different regions in Spain and Portugal have been affected by the Structural and Cohesion Funds 
within the industrial and labor market context. This study will attempt to answer the following 
questions: (i) have these funds reduced economic disparities among and within the different 
regions of the Iberian Peninsula? and (ii) what sectors of the economy in the Iberian Peninsula 
have benefited the most?  
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 summarizes the findings on 
the importance of the structural funds on economic convergence. Section 3 describes the 
empirical approach that was employed in this paper as well as the findings. Section 4 discusses 
the challenges that the Commission faces when allocating the funds and section 5 offers some 
potential solutions to these problems. Finally, section 6 offers some conclusions.  
 
 
                                                 
2 See European Commission reports 1991, 1994, 1996 and 1999.  
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Cohesion Policy: Convergence or Divergence? 
 
Economists have conflicting views on the relationship between economic integration and 
convergence. The differences in viewpoints are caused by diverging beliefs in the underlying 
assumptions on economic growth.  The traditional views, which are based on comparative 
advantage, postulate improvements in economic convergence among countries or regions 
provided that the factors of mobility and diffusion of technology are not restricted.  In other 
words, technological improvements operate so that the presence of free trade and unrestrained 
market competition allows for economic convergence to take place.  Integration would lead to 
greater economic development through a convergence process. If convergence is not observed, 
this approach suggests that production factors are immobile or that prices are artificially 
determined and the full gains of economic integration cannot be reached.   
 
  An opposite view is the agglomeration theory developed by Krugman (1991), and the 
endogenous growth models of Romer (1986 and 1990).  Both views stress that market-driven 
mechanisms cannot possibly induce economic convergence but are instead bound to increase and 
worsen existing economic inequalities.  They argue that increasing returns to scale and 
externalities lead production factors to concentrate in the more developed areas.  The nature of 
modern technologies is such that market forces - when left to themselves - lead to inequality and 
divergence in growth rates. As a result, economic integration widens economic divergence. This 
latter view interprets financial assistance –through programs such as the Structural Funds- as a 
system of transfers to the most lagging countries or regions and not necessarily to foster 
economic development, as suggested by Obstfeld and Peri (1998), and Boldrin and Canovas 
(2001).   
 
The considerable amount of resources the Commission has devoted in assistance funds to 
curve inequality, raises the question whether these funds have been effective or not. There have 
been several studies that have attempted to empirically evaluate the impact of financial 
assistance in Europe, but these studies have not been conclusive. Bosca, Domenech and Taguas 
(1999) found that EU transfers contributed in reducing differences between the income per head 
of Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Spain and the rest of the Union.  The European Commission has 
also conducted several studies that evaluate the impact of these funds.  In 1997 they concluded 
that financial assistance had a significant effect in reducing disparities in economic performance 
across the Union.  Two years later in 1999 they reported that EU structural assistance increased 
GDP, on average, from 0.4 to 0.9 percentage points in Greece, Portugal, and Ireland, and from 
0.3 to 0.5 per cent in Spain.  Similarly, Garcia and Maria-Dolores (2001) found that Structural 
Funds were able to increase the speed of economic convergence of the recipient regions. 
 
In contrast, Boldrin and Canova (2001) showed that the economic behavior of the 
assisted regions was not particularly different from the rest of the Union.  They found no 
evidence that: (1) the policies adopted were the most appropriate in terms of economic 
efficiency, and (2) the substantial amount of public resources funneled by the Community to 
lesser developed regions served any economic purpose other than redistributing income.  The 
second point argues that the assignment of these funds is not enhancing or fostering economic 
growth but is rather politically motivated.  Furthermore they argue that on average, uniform 
long-run growth rates are to be expected and relative differences will not disappear.  They reject  
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the idea that divergence and polarization are driving the growth process.  In their empirical 
findings they did not find any evidence that regions receiving aid from the Structural and 
Cohesion Funds are behaving any differently from those that are not.  
 
 
The Case of Spain and Portugal 
 
Spain and Portugal did not join the EU until 1986, almost forty years after the European 
integration process originated.  The longstanding authoritarian regimes in these two countries 
were the principle deterrents to join the Community, as having a democratic government was one 
of the unwritten rules of accession to the EU.  
 
Under objective 1 of the Structural Funds, regions become eligible only when their GDP 
per-capita is below the 75
th percentile of the EU average.  As a result, Portugal and Spain have 
extensively benefited from EU assistance funds. For instance during the period 1988-1998, Spain 
received 22.25 per cent, and Portugal received 11.11 per cent of the total amount of structural 
funds allocated to all European countries during this period. Spain received 10,171 million 
ECU’s during 1989-1999 and 26,300 million € during 2000-2006. Portugal, on the other hand 
received 8450 million ECU’s during 1989-1999 and 13,980 million € during 2000-2006. With 
regards to the Cohesion Fund, Spain received 54.9 per cent of the total money allocated by this 
fund for the period 1994-1999 and Portugal 18.10 per cent.  That is an additional 8809 million € 
for Spain and 2885 million € for Portugal. See Table 1 for a detailed decomposition of assistance 
funds by region for 1994-1999.
 3 
 
The goal of these transfers is to attain the objectives set by the funds by means of 
improving physical infrastructure, capital stock, and the productivity of the labor force.   
However, not all the resources come directly from Brussels.  Each region can also commit a 
certain amount of resources to their projects through co-payments.  Table 1 presents the 
percentages co-financed by the regions to the total costs of the projects. 
 
The data shows that regions with a lower GDP per capita tend to receive a larger amount 
of resources relative to regions with a higher income per capita. Given that the poorer regions are 
receiving more aid in relation to the richer regions, inequality should increase ceteris paribus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The regions in Spain are Galicia, Principado de Asturias, Cantabria, the Basque Country, Navarra, Rioja, Aragon, 
Madrid, Castilla &Leon, Castilla-la-Mancha, Extremadura, Catalonia, Valencia, Balearic Islands, Andalucia, 
Murcia, Ceuta & Melilla and Canary Islands. The regions in Portugal are North, Centre, Lisbon and the Tagus, 
Alentejo, Algarve, Azores and Madeira.  
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Table 1: Funds to Total Cost and Co-payment to Total Cost by Region. 
Regions  Obj. 1  Obj. 2  Obj. 3  Obj. 5b  Reg. Co-pmt
4  SF/GDP 
Galicia  63.94%      36.06% 0.0127 
Principado de Asturias  59.50%     40.50% 0.0101 
Cantabria  62.61%     37.39% 0.0091 
Basque Country   20.50% 44.99% 31.05% 77.37% 0.0038 
 Navarra   19.32% 44.99% 35.29% 70.40% 0.0035 
Rioja   16.32% 45.11% 22.62% 79.43% 0.0031 
Aragon   28.72% 45.01% 39.56% 64.39% 0.0048 
Madrid   36.79% 45.00% 43.92% 60.88% 0.0007 
Castilla &  Leon  54.67%      45.33% 0.0102 
Castilla-la Mancha  49.53%     50.47% 0.0124 
Extremadura  64.01%     35.99% 0.0196 
Catalonia   16.16% 45.03% 41.04% 81.81% 0.002 
Valencia  40.33%     59.67% 0.0049 
Balearic Islands   19.32% 44.79% 32.50% 71.66% 0.0012 
Andalucia  43.39%     56.61% 0.009 
Murcia  41.87%     58.13% 0.0077 
Ceuta & Melilla   60.96%     39.04%  0.0143 
Canary Islands  60.76%     39.24% 0.0109 
North  72.09%     27.91% 0.0041 
Centre  73.36%     26.64% 0.0049 
Lisbon and the Tagus Valley  72.68%     27.32% 0.002 
Alentejo  63.22%     36.78% 0.013 
Algarve  67.50%     32.50% 0.0054 
Azores  77.35%     22.65% 0.0812 
Madeira  65.10%     34.90% 0.0421 
 
 
The contribution of each region to the total cost of projects changes substantially from 
region to region, from a low of 18.19 per cent to a high of 77.35 per cent. Furthermore, we find 
that regions with a high GDP per capita tend to contribute (on average) more to the projects than 
regions with a lower GDP per capita.  We observe that all Portuguese regions except Alentejo 
contributed no more than 37 per cent. In contrast, 11 out of 19 Spanish regions are committing 
more than 50 per cent to the total cost of the project. 
 
                                                 
4 The amount of co-payment is obtained from the official reports on the Structural Funds (11
th annual report). The 
total aggregated costs of the Programs and structural funds assistance were given from 1994-1999 for each region by 
objectives (objective 1, 2, 3, 5b for Spain, objective 1 for Portugal).  The ratio of structural funds assistance to total 
costs yields the percentage of the total costs financed by the structural funds (one minus this ratio yields the co-
payment amount). Once the percentage of co-payment is calculated, a value is estimated for each region and year 
which is obtained by using the co-payment ratio and actual payments received during a year.  With this methodology 
we are assuming the amount of co-payment and SF assistance is constant during the cycle of each project. 
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 Measuring the Effects of the Assistance Funds in the Iberian Peninsula  
 
There are various studies that evaluate the role of assistance funds in the Iberian Peninsula.  
These studies typically track the evolution of macroeconomic indicators such as GDP per capita, 
and unemployment rates by regions/gender/age.  Bean, Bertola and Dolado (2000) described 
how Portugal has experienced a drastic change in the geographical pattern of its trade flow 
during the last decade. The article finds that the proportion of intra-EU trade has risen from 48 
per cent to 75 per cent. In this respect it is important to emphasize the role of textiles, which 
contributes 30 per cent of export earnings. The combination of low labor costs, EU investment 
incentives, and a favorable local tax regime has provided an attractive environment for foreign 
investment.  FDI flows in recent years averaged 3-4 per cent of GDP. The annual inflow of FDI 
has more than doubled as a share of total investment compared to the 1980-85 period. There has 
been selective FDI in some sectors with a strong export orientation (food and beverages, 
electrical engineering), which has affected the specialization within Portuguese manufacturing.  
 
Spain on the other hand, had a highly diversified industrial structure and the importance 
of sectors sensitive to integration was lower than in Portugal and Greece. Intra-industry trade 
intensified particularly in products of medium and low quality and in sectors with strong or 
intermediate demand at the EU level. Western Europe has always been the most important 
market for Spanish trade.  This fact was reinforced after the accession to the EU. Exports to the 
EU have increased their share from 52 per cent in 1986 to 67 per cent in 1991. On the exports 
side foodstuffs gradually lost their share, while durable consumer goods (especially cars) 
exported to the EU and capital goods to Latin-American countries increased in importance. With 
regard to imports, capital goods have raised their share in total imports from 11 per cent in 1985 
to 24 per cent in 1996. FDI flows increased strongly after accession, growing from 1.2 per cent 
of GDP in 1986 to 4.2 per cent in 1991, and falling thereafter, being mostly concentrated in 
manufacturing (43 per cent) and the financial sector (35 per cent). 
 
At first glance it seems that the Iberian Peninsula has indeed benefited from the Structural 
and Cohesion Funds, restructuring and modernizing its economy.  Various studies from the 
Commission are finding that these funds are reaching their objectives.
5   A more interesting 
question is to determine if the economic changes that are taking place in the various sectors and 
industries are caused by the influx of these assistance funds. More precisely from objective 1, we 
would expect the gap -measured in per capita GDP- between lagging regions and the EU average 
to diminish.  From objective 2-6 we would expect the unemployment rate in recipient regions to 
decrease as well. Regional data on industrial wages contains very useful information which will 
allow us to explore any relevant changes in the recipient regions and sectors caused by the 
Structural and Cohesion Funds. 
 
In this paper we have examined the evolution of wage inequality in the recipient regions 
at different points of time. In principle there are two potential dimensions of inequality that can 
be studied: (1) the evolution of inequality in Spain, and Portugal with respect to Europe (the 
Commission has focused most of its attention to this dimension), and (2) the evolution of 
inequality within the different regions in the Iberian Peninsula.  In the latter case we have 
measured pay inequality among the industrial sectors within each region. If the European 
                                                 
5 For further details see the European Commission reports 1991, 1994, 1996 and 1999.  
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integration process leads to convergence we would expect to find convergence from individual 
countries to the European average and individual regions to the national average. In contrast, if 
integration actually leads to divergence due to agglomeration effects, then we should observe 
different patterns of inequality within the Iberian Peninsula and within Europe. By studying these 
two different aspects of inequality we will be able to better understand the convergence process 
in the Iberian Peninsula. 
 
The data source that we have used to measure inequality is EUROSTAT, the official 
database used by the Commission for the evaluation of regional policy.  EUROSTAT publishes a 
regional database called New Cronos Regio.  In this database there are two main data sets 
produced by EUROSTAT labeled ESA 79 and ESA 95.  The first data set includes data from the 
year 1983 to 1994 and the second data set from 1995 to 1999. In this paper we employ the Theil 
statistic as a measure of inequality.
6   In  our analysis we classify regions by  NUTS level 2 
consistent with the Commissions methodology to declare regions as eligible recipients for 
financial aid funds.
7 The Theil statistics can be expressed as follows: 
 






= ∑
= Y
i
n
i Y
i y y
n
T
µ µ
log *
1
1
          ( 1 )  
 
where i y  denotes the income of an individual region indexed by i,  n is the number of individuals 
in the population and µ is the average income. One of the most attractive features of this statistic 
is its decomposition property.  As long as a distribution of income and a distribution of 
individuals are grouped into mutually exclusive and completely exhaustive (MECE) groups 
overall inequality can be decomposed into a between group component, and a within group 
component.  After grouping individuals into m generic MECE groups we can decompose overall 
inequality into a between group component, B T , and a within group component,  W T .  The 
between measure B T , is derived from group means where only inequality between groups are 
considered, while the within measure,  W T , is a weighted average of the Theil inequality indexes 
for each group.
8  We use the between group component  B T as an estimate for inequality as argued 
by Conceição and Galbraith (2000).  The authors provide formal criteria under which the 
between group component of the Theil index tracks the overall movement of inequality, 
concluding that, under some very general conditions, the dynamics of overall inequality can be 
captured using only the between group component of the Theil index. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6  Appendix A provides the list of provinces used in our analysis. Appendix B provides a list of the different 
industries from both classifications.   
7  EUROSTAT also produces its own geographical classification scheme for statistical purposes.  Geographical 
European units are hierarchically categorized as Nomenclature of territorial units (NUTS).  These hierarchical levels 
include four levels: NUTS level 0, NUTS level 1, NUTS level 2 and NUTS level 3. The first level NUTS level 0 
corresponds to the European nations and the last level NUTS level 3 corresponds to counties (if it were the case of 
the US).    
8 See Appendix B for further details on the construction of the Theil statistic.  
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National Inequality in the Iberian Peninsula 
 
In this section we study the evolution of national inequality during the period 1989-1999.  We 
calculate two types of inequality measures: pay (wage) inequality, and GDP inequality.  The first 
measure – pay inequality– is constructed from 16 different sectors in each regional unit.
9  With 
this measure we calculate: (1) the Theil inequality statistic within each region, and (2) a regional 
contribution to Spain and Portugal. The information on wages and employees is taken from 
Eurostat’s REGIO database.
10 The second inequality measure –GDP– captures the inequality of 
industrial and non-industrial sectors; i.e, all the productive sectors in the economy. For this 
measure we calculate: (1) the regional contribution to Spain and Portugal, and (2) the regional 
contribution to the European average.  The GDP at the regional level is also taken from 
Eurostat’s REGIO database. 
 
When studying the regional contribution we use the between Theil index.
11  The sum of 
the between Theil components is used as a measure of the total inequality in Spain and Portugal.  
The same methodology is used for the within component, the only difference is the selection of 
groups.  For the within component each sector is considered a group. The sum of the contribution 
from each group gives an inequality measure at the regional level.  For the between component 
each region is a group.  The sum of their contributions gives an inequality measure for Spain and 
Portugal. 
 
In order to see the extent to which the Structural and Cohesion funds have affected 
regions we consider a pre and post funds period. Due to data limitations we split the periods into 
pre-structural funds, 1984-1989, and post structural funds, 1990-1999. We first examine 
inequality at the national level so we can determine how differences in industrial wages in Spain 
and Portugal have evolved over time. We then examine the overall GDP inequality between the 
different regions in Spain and Portugal, see Tables 2 and 3.
12  
 
 
Table 2: Between Wage Theil. 
Country Period Mean (µ ) Median
Pre S.F.  0.0028 0.0034  Spain 
Post S.F. 0.0052 0.0034 
Pre S.F.  0.0041 0.0030  Portugal 
Post S.F. 0.0094 0.0088 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 See Appendix B for the list of Sectors. 
10 We use the variable compensation = Wages and salaries + Employers’ social contributions + Employers’ actual 
social contributions + Employers’ imputed social contributions. 
11 For further details on this statistic see Appendix C. 
12 Data for the wage Theil is available from 1983-1999 for Spain and 1986-1999 for Portugal.  For the GDP Theil 
data for Spain and Portugal is available from 1986-1999.   
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Table 3: Between GDP Theil. 
Country Period  Mean (µ ) Median 
Pre S.F.  0.0194 0.0194  Spain 
Post S.F. 0.0224 0.0200 
Pre S.F.  0.0366 0.0389  Portugal 
Post S.F. 0.0233 0.0238 
 
As we can see from Tables 2 and 3, overall wage inequality between the different regions 
in Spain and Portugal has increased since the assistance funds have been in place.  More 
precisely, differences in wage compensation in Spain and Portugal were smaller when the Iberian 
Peninsula did not receive any assistance funds. In particular, the distribution of wages for 
industrial workers has become more unequal in the Iberian Peninsula over the past decade, while 
GDP inequality among the different regions in Portugal has decreased but has increased in the 
case of Spain.  Assistance funds may have been successful at curving the regional GDP 
disparities in Portugal but may have worsened for the case of Spain. These findings suggest that 
non industrial sectors, the ones not previously considered in the wage analysis, in Portugal have 
benefited the most from the assistance funds.  
 
In order to have a better idea about which regions have become the most unequal in the 
Iberian Peninsula we proceed with our analysis at the regional level. As resources are distributed 
across the various regions, one would expect regional inequalities to decrease. In Table 4 we 
present the evolution of wage inequality within the different regions in the Iberian Peninsula 
before and after the assistance funds.  We compare the percentage change between these two 
time periods to determine the relative effect of the assistance funds in the various regions.  The 
last column of Table 4 is the ratio of structural funds received relative to GDP.  
 
The data reveal that all regions in Spain have experienced an increase in pay-inequality 
after receiving aid from the assistance funds. In particular, Galicia, Principado de Asturias, 
Basque Country, Madrid, Catalonia, Balearic Islands, Andalucia and Canary Islands have more 
than doubled their wage inequality. Workers in these regions were facing a smaller wage 
differential across sectors before the assistance funds were granted. A similar trend is observed 
in Portugal, where all Portuguese regions have increased their wages disparities.
13  In particular, 
Algarve and Centre have more than double pay inequality after the assistance funds have been in 
place.   
 
The differential in worker compensation across the different industries in each region of 
the Iberian Peninsula has increased steadily over the years despite receiving large amounts of aid 
from the Structural Funds. This finding may suggest that the different industrial sectors in the 
Iberian Peninsula are growing at different rates exacerbating the differences among regions. 
Furthermore we find a positive correlation between the change in inequality and the amount of 
assistance funds received over the years. Thus regions that tend to experience an increase in 
inequality tend to receive a larger amount of assistance funds.
14   
                                                 
13 In the case of Portugal we can not determine the relative increase or decrease of within wage inequality in Azores 
and Madeira because of lack of data.  
14 The correlation between the percentage change in within wage Theil and the amount of structural funds over GDP 
by region received over the period 1989-1999 is equal to 0.1372.  
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Table 4: Within Regional Wage Inequality 
   Within Theil Wages  % Change  Struc. Funds/GDP 
Regions   ’83-‘88 ‘88-‘99      ‘89-‘99 
Galicia   0.0348 0.0963  176.96  0.0127 
Princ. De Asturias  0.0263 0.0738  180.94  0.0101 
Cantabria  0.023 0.0615  167.55  0.0091 
Basque Country  0.0236 0.0529  124.15  0.0038 
Navarra  0.0243 0.0464  90.43  0.0035 
Rioja  0.0314 0.0462  47.24  0.0031 
Aragon  0.027 0.0431  59.78  0.0048 
Madrid  0.0242 0.0533  120.23  0.0007 
Castilla & Leon  0.0278 0.0463  66.43  0.0102 
Castilla-la Mancha  0.0409 0.056  37.00  0.0124 
Extremadura  0.0319 0.0593  86.30  0.0196 
Catalonia  0.0308 0.0649  110.46  0.002 
Valencia  0.0269 0.052  93.47  0.0049 
Balearic Islands  0.0374 0.0769  105.65  0.0012 
Andalucia  0.0232 0.0656  183.02  0.009 
Murcia   0.0358 0.0672  87.60  0.0077 
Ceuta & Melilla  0.0294 0.0602  105.02  0.0143 
Canary Islands  0.0353 0.0808  129.02  0.0109 
North  0.0379 0.0744  96.29  0.0041 
Centre  0.0385 0.0776  101.69  0.0049 
Lisbon & Tagus  0.0462 0.0513  10.96  0.002 
Alentejo  0.059 0.0947  60.43  0.013 
Algarve   0.0351 0.0848  141.84  0.0054 
Azores   . 0.1589  .  0.0812 
Madeira   . 0.113  .  0.0421 
  
At a first glance it appears that the effectiveness of the Structural Funds in curving 
overall inequality in Spain and Portugal has had mixed results.  It also seems that there has been 
a change in the industrial composition of the Iberian economy after Spain and Portugal joined 
the EU. 
 
 
Industrial Inequality in the Iberian Peninsula   
 
In order to have a better understanding about which sectors are the main contributors to the 
increased regional pay inequality, we construct the between industrial Theil statistic for Spain 
and Portugal, see Table 4a and 4b.  
 
We recall that the sum of the between Theil component can be used as an estimate for an 
overall measure of inequality.  The individual components are the contributions from each group  
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included in the index.  Some components will have a negative value while other components will 
have a positive value.  When a particular component is equal to the average of the group – a 
situation of perfect equality – that particular contribution equals zero.  Negative values suggest 
that a particular region is below the average, while positive values are for groups above the 
average.  In particular, a region with the smallest negative or biggest positive between Theil 
components is a region that is furthest away from the average, thus contributing the most to 
inequality. By comparing the individual between Theil components from year to year we can 
determine whether a particular region is pulling away from the average.   If a particular 
component is further away from zero, the increase can be caused by the following two cases: (1) 
the value of that particular group has increased/decreased further away from the group mean, or 
(2) the value of that particular region remains the same, and the group mean has 
increased/decreased.  In either case that particular region will contribute more to inequality. If we 
want to measure whether a particular region or industry has contributed more or less to 
inequality across time, we compare the distance of that particular contribution to zero – a perfect 
equality case– from year to year to see whether it has increased/decreased in absolute terms. 
 
We now examine the evolution of the industrial sectors in Spain and Portugal from 1983-
1994. For each group analysis we include two tables. The first table displays the average of the 
between components for each group during both periods, and the absolute change among both 
averages.  A positive absolute change represents a positive contribution to inequality while a 
negative change means it has contributed less to inequality.  The second table is based on a 
ranking system.  For each year we rank each group based on their between contributions.  We 
assign the value of 1 to the lowest negative component and the value of 16 to the highest positive 
component and we then construct the average rank for the pre and for post Structural Fund 
period.  Based on this average rank we sort each industry accordingly, from the lowest to the 
highest.  We then can, on average, determine whether some groups have contributed more or less 
to inequality in the post Structural Fund era relative to other groups.   
 
The data presented in Tables 4a and 4b show that industries that contributed the most to 
inequality in Spain during the pre-assistance period were transport and communications services; 
chemical products; fuel and power products; and service of credit and insurance institutions. The 
workers in these industries received higher wages relative to the other industries during the pre- 
funding era. Similarly, recovery, repairs, trade, lodging and catering services; textiles and 
clothing, leather and footwear; products of various industries; and non market services increased 
inequality since their wage was lower than the national average.  
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Table 4a: Absolute Change between Industrial Theil in Spain ESA 79.  
Sectors '83-'88  89-'94 
Absolute 
Change 
Recovery, repair, trade, lodging and catering services  -0.0277 -0.0366  0.0089 
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear  -0.0131 -0.0095  -0.0036 
Products of various industries  -0.0068 -0.0063  -0.0005 
Non-market services  -0.0036 -0.0044  0.0008 
Food, beverages, tobacco  -0.0036 -0.0018  -0.0018 
Other market services  -0.0029 -0.0048  0.0019 
Metal products, machinery, equipment and electrical goods  -0.0013 -0.0007  -0.0006 
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products  -0.0009 -0.0005  -0.0004 
Paper and printing products  -0.0006 -0.0007  0.0001 
Building and construction  0.0026 0.0060  0.0033 
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals, other than radioactive  0.0043 0.0034 -0.0009 
Transport equipment  0.0046 0.0051  0.0005 
Chemical products  0.0052 0.0050 -0.0002 
Transport and communication services  0.0070 0.0115  0.0045 
Fuel and power products  0.0144 0.0134 -0.0010 
Services of credit and insurance institutions  0.0477 0.0493  0.0016 
 
After the funds have been allocated, we find that textiles, and clothing, leather and 
footwear; and food, beverages and tobacco have reduced pay-inequality the most relative to their 
pre-fund era.  On the other hand, transport and communication services; and recovery, repair, 
trade, lodging and catering services, have actually increased pay inequality.  Among those 
industries with a negative Theil contribution –below the national average– textiles and, clothing, 
leather, and footwear; and food, beverages and tobacco have been catching up the most to the 
national average during the post Structural Funds era.  In contrast, recovery, repair, trade, 
lodging and catering services have fallen behind the national average. Finally, transport and 
communication services have contributed to inequality the most by growing much faster than the 
national average.   
 
From Table 4b we observe that wage inequality among the different industrial sectors has 
barely changed over the past decade. In particular, the group of industries that contributed the 
most to wage inequality during the post-assistance period is still basically the same with respect 
to the pre-fund era, except for transportation equipment. This suggests that the industrial 
composition of the most unequal and equal sectors in Spain has not evolved substantially over 
the last decade. However this does not suggest that the assistance funds have not been successful 
at transforming the industrial composition of Spain. The data reveal a dynamic composition of 
industries affecting wage inequality over the last decade since the value of the average ranking 
and the value of the sorting are not identical. In other words, the contribution to inequality by the 
different sectors has evolved over time. 
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Table 4b: Relative Ranking, Between Industrial Theil in Spain, ESA 79. 
   Pre SF  Pre SF  Post SF  
Post 
SF  
 Sectors  Av Rank  Rank  Av Rank  Rank
Recovery, repair, trade, lodging and catering services  1.00 1 1.00  1 
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear  2.00 2 2.33  2 
Products of various industries  3.00 3 3.33  3 
Non-market services  4.67 4 5.50  5 
Food, Beverages, tobacco  5.33 5 5.50  6 
Other market services  6.17 6 4.33  4 
Metal products, machinery, equipment and electrical goods  6.83 7 7.67  8 
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products  7.67 8 7.83  9 
Paper and printing products  8.50 9 7.50  7 
Building and construction  11.33 10 11.50  11 
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals
15,   11.50 11 10.50  10 
Transport equipment  11.83 12 12.33  13 
Transport and communication services  12.50 13 14.17  14 
Chemical products  12.67 14 11.67  12 
Fuel and power products  15.00 15 14.83  15 
Services of credit and insurance institutions  16.00 16 16.00  16 
 
A similar trend is observed in Portugal, see Tables 4c and 4d. Fuel and power products; 
non market services; transport and communications and services; services of credit and insurance 
institutions contributed the most to wage inequality before the assistance funds were in place. In 
particular these sectors had a higher wage differential than the national average. In contrast, 
building and construction; textiles and clothing, leather and footwear; and recovery repair, trade, 
lodging and catering services had a lower wage differential than the other sectors that contributed 
to pay-inequality before the assistances funds were granted.  
 
After the funds were in place, we find that building and construction; and transport and 
communication services decreased inequality the most.  In particular, building and construction 
have a negative Theil component while transport and communication services have a positive 
component.  The former industrial sector is catching up the most, while the latter sector is falling 
behind the most:  the growth in the building and construction industry is increasing faster relative 
to the other sectors. On the contrary, non-market services have increased pay-inequality during 
the post structural funds era. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 other than radioactive  
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Table 4c: Absolute Change between Industrial Theil in Portugal ESA 79. 
Sectors '83-'88  89-'94 
Absolute 
Change 
Building and construction  -0.0320 -0.0217  -0.0103 
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear  -0.0242 -0.0345  0.0103 
Recovery, repair, trade, lodging and catering services  -0.0231 -0.0270  0.0039 
Products of various industries  -0.0093 -0.0097  0.0005 
Food, beverages, tobacco  -0.0082 -0.0079  -0.0003 
Other market services  -0.0062 -0.0066  0.0004 
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products  -0.0013 -0.0031  0.0018 
Metal products, machinery, equipment and electrical goods  0.0004 -0.0048  0.0044 
Paper and printing products  0.0030 0.0025 -0.0004 
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals, other than radioactive  0.0034 0.0006 -0.0028 
Transport equipment  0.0061 0.0043 -0.0018 
Chemical products  0.0070 0.0089  0.0020 
Fuel and power products  0.0138 0.0187  0.0049 
Non-market services  0.0315 0.0549  0.0235 
Transport and communication services  0.0384 0.0328 -0.0056 
Services of credit and insurance institutions  0.0446 0.0491  0.0045 
 
The data in Table 4d reveal that in Portugal service industries were reducing pay 
inequality the most after the assistance funds were in place.  The data also show an even greater 
dynamic composition of industries affecting wage inequality over the last decade since the value 
of the average ranking and the sorting are not identical. In other words, the contribution to 
inequality by the different sectors has evolved through time suggesting an increased flexibility in 
the Portuguese labor market.  
 
A common trend is observed in Spain and Portugal. The industrial sectors that have 
reduced inequality the most have been the service industries. This overall trend in Spain and in 
Portugal shows that the Iberian Peninsula is slowly moving towards a service oriented economy. 
In particular, since the service industries are growing at a faster rate, they will need to attract 
more workers by offering higher wages in relation to other industrial sectors. As the Iberian 
Peninsula becomes more integrated into the EU, competition among industrial sectors increases. 
As a result of this new externally driven competition, less efficient sectors are growing slower.  
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Table 4d: Relative Ranking, Between Industrial Theil in Portugal, ESA 79. 
   Pre SF  Pre SF  Post SF  
Post 
SF  
 Sectors  Av Rank  Rank  Av Rank  Rank 
Building and construction  1.00 1 2.67  3 
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear  2.00 2 1.33  1 
Recovery, repair, trade, lodging and catering services  3.00 3 2.00  2 
Products of various industries  4.00 4 4.17  4 
Food, Beverages, tobacco  5.00 5 5.33  5 
Other market services  6.00 6 6.17  6 
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products  7.00 7 7.50  8 
Metal products, machinery, equipment and electrical goods  8.00 8 6.83  7 
Paper and printing products  9.00 9 9.83  10 
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals,
 16  10.00 10  9.17 9 
Transport equipment  11.33 11 11.17  11 
Chemical products  11.67 12 11.83  12 
Fuel and power products  13.00 13 13.00  13 
Non-market services  14.33 14 15.83  16 
Transport and communication services  14.67 15 14.00  14 
Services of credit and insurance institutions  16.00 16 15.17  15 
 
As we can see, assistance funds in Spain and Portugal may have been playing a catalyst 
role in the industrial and labor market transformation of the Iberian economy.  
 
 
National and Regional Contribution to Inequality  
 
In this section we examine how regional pay inequality has progressed relative to Spain and 
Portugal, and relative to Europe. We first examine in Table 5 how wage inequality between the 
different regions in Spain and Portugal has changed over time relative to: (1) the Iberian 
Peninsula and (2) Europe. 
 
The data in Table 5 shows that there are some regions in Spain and Portugal that have 
increased wage inequality relative to their own country but all regions have reduced pay 
inequality when compared to the European average.  
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Table 5: Between Wage Theil in the Iberian Peninsula. 
  Wage Theil Relative to own country  Wage Theil Relative to EU  
Regions  Av 83-88  Av 89-99 
Absolute 
Change  Av 83-88  Av 89-99 
Absolute 
Change 
 Valencia  -0.0093 -0.0106 0.0012 -0.0055 -0.0042 -0.0014 
 Andalucia  -0.0065 -0.0109 0.0044 -0.0064 -0.0048 -0.0016 
 Galicia  -0.0052 -0.0086 0.0034 -0.0032 -0.0026 -0.0006 
 Castilla-la Mancha  -0.0028 -0.0030 0.0002 -0.0018 -0.0013 -0.0005 
 Murcia  -0.0026 -0.0033 0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0003 
 Extremadura  -0.0016 -0.0019 0.0003 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0003 
 Rioja  -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0005  -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 Balearic Islands  -0.0005 0.0000 -0.0005  -0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0004 
 Cantabria  -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001  -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 Canary Islands   0.0000 -0.0010 0.0010  -0.0014 -0.0011 -0.0003 
 Navarra
17  0.0005 0.0013 0.0008  -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 Ceuta & Melilla   0.0008 0.0005 -0.0003  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Aragón  0.0012 0.0017 0.0005  -0.0012 -0.0006 -0.0006 
 Castilla & León  0.0013 0.0003 -0.0010  -0.0023 -0.0014 -0.0009 
 Principado de Asturias  0.0024 0.0008 -0.0016  -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0004 
 Catalonia  0.0043 0.0086 0.0042  -0.0071 -0.0036 -0.0035 
 Basque Country  0.0068 0.0097 0.0029  -0.0019 -0.0003 -0.0016 
 Madrid  0.0147 0.0218 0.0071  -0.0045 -0.0014 -0.0030 
 North  -0.0381 -0.0434 0.0054 -0.0098 -0.0082 -0.0016 
 Centre   -0.0160 -0.0133 -0.0027  -0.0039 -0.0035 -0.0004 
 Algarve  -0.0029 -0.0025 -0.0004  -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0000 
 Alentejo  -0.0022 -0.0009 -0.0013  -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0000 
 Lisbon &  Tagus Valley  0.0674 0.0694 0.0020  -0.0116 -0.0084 -0.0031 
 Azores   .  0.0003  .   .   -0.0004  .  
 Madeira   .  0.0000  .   .   -0.0005  .  
 
After the funds have been in place, we find that Valencia, Andalucia, and Galicia have 
contributed the most to wage inequality in Spain since their wage differential is lower than the 
Spanish average. On the other hand, Catalonia, Basque Country, and Madrid have contributed 
the most to inequality by means of higher pay.  In contrast, Extremadura and Murcia have 
contributed the least to inequality.  In the case of Portugal, we find that North and Lisbon and the 
Tagus Valley are the regions that have contributed the most to wage inequality after the funds 
have been in place.  These regions have a higher wage than the Portuguese average. In contrast, 
Centre and Alentejo have decreased inequality. Thus the assistance funds have helped reduce the 
wage inequality within those regions when compared to the Portuguese average. 
 
When comparing inequality with respect to the European average, we see that all regions 
in the Iberian Peninsula are below the EU average. Before the funds that had been granted the 
most negative Theil components occurred in regions with a large population share such as 
Andalucia and Catalonia.  After the assistance funds were in place we see that the majority of 
regions reduced wage inequality. In particular, wealthier regions such as Catalonia, Lisbon and 
the Tagus Valley, and Madrid reduced inequality more than poorer regions.  Only, Algarve, 
Alentejo and Ceuta & Melilla did not curve inequality. It seems then that the transfer of funds 
from other European nations through assistance funds has been successful at reducing inequality 
                                                 
17 Comunidad Foral de Navarra.  
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with respect to Europe. This positive aspect of redistribution has not necessarily reduced regional 
inequality with respect to the Iberian Peninsula.  
 
The data suggest that some sort of agglomeration forces and increasing return to scale 
operate in the Iberian Peninsula.  Regions from the Iberian Peninsula with a higher GDP per 
capita tend to contribute the most to wage inequality.  Regions with lower GDP per capita are the 
ones that tend to reduce inequality the most with respect to Europe. On the other hand, not all 
regions are catching up with Europe at the same rate and not all regions within the Iberian 
Peninsula are becoming more similar. The fact that we can observe some asymmetries with 
respect to the speed of convergence in wages among regions suggests that the impact of the 
assistance funds in these regions may exacerbate differences.  Regions that can potentially grow 
faster might attract more resources from other industries and/or from other regions and widen the 
gap further. As a result, the wage distribution among industrial workers within the Iberian 
Peninsula has become more unequal and skewed. 
 
Are these trends observed at a more aggregated level?  Do we observe the same 
phenomena when we incorporate the non industrial sectors?  In order to answer these questions 
we examine the evolution of regional inequality in industrial and non-industrial sectors, by 
constructing the regional GDP Theil contribution relative to Spain and Portugal and relative to 
Europe, see Table 6. We can then explore how aggregate inequality has evolved before and after 
the assistance funds.   
 
The data show that the regions of Andalucia, Galicia and Extremadura increased the GDP 
inequality in Spain before the funds were even granted by growing at a slower rate. On the other 
hand, Basque Country, Catalonia and Madrid tended to increase GDP inequality by growing 
faster than the Spanish average. Since the regional composition is basically the same when 
examining wage and GDP between Theils, we may argue that the relative weight of the non 
industrial sectors in those regions can not change their growth experiences. Once the funds were 
granted, the composition of regions that contribute the most to inequality remain basically the 
same with the exception of Aragon which helped to increase inequality.  
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Table 6: Between GDP Theil in the Iberian Peninsula 
Regions 
Relative 
Own 
Av 86-88 
Relative 
Own 
Av 89-99 
Relative 
Own 
Absolute 
Change 
Relative 
E.U. 
Av 86-88 
Relative 
E.U. 
Av 89-99 
Relative E.U. 
Absolute 
Change 
 Andalucia  -0.03677 -0.03948 0.0027 -6.6E-08 -7.2E-08 5.9809E-09
 Galicia  -0.01444 -0.01341 -0.0010 -2.9E-08 -3E-08 1.14403E-09
 Extremadura  -0.00789 -0.00751 -0.0004 -9.4E-09 -1E-08 1.07289E-09
 Castilla-la Mancha  -0.00767 -0.00669 -0.0010 -1.7E-08 -1.9E-08 2.00299E-09
 Castilla & León  -0.00481 -0.00509 0.0003 -3E-08 -3.2E-08 1.56362E-09
 Murcia  -0.00148 -0.00303 0.0015 -1.2E-08 -1.3E-08 7.9479E-10
 Principado de Asturias  -0.00065 -0.00242 0.0018 -1.4E-08 -1.4E-08 -4.59274E-12
 Cantabria  -0.00041 -0.0004 0.0000 -6.4E-09 -6.9E-09 4.122E-10
 Ceuta & Melilla    -0.00037 -0.00041 0.0000 -1.5E-09 -1.5E-09 -1.21329E-11
 Canary Islands    -7.6E-06 -0.00156 0.0015 -1.8E-08 -1.9E-08 1.29006E-09
 Valencia  0.000619 -0.00255 0.0019 -4.7E-08 -5E-08 3.20731E-09
 Rioja  0.001085 0.000956 -0.0001 -3.6E-09 -3.9E-09 2.39593E-10
 Aragón  0.003174 0.003396 0.0002 -1.6E-08 -1.8E-08 1.1245E-09
 Navarra
16  0.003633 0.003757 0.0001 -7.9E-09 -8.4E-09 4.62931E-10
 Balearic Islands  0.005773 0.005283 -0.0005 -1E-08 -1.1E-08 9.7741E-10
 Basque Country  0.014603 0.011418 -0.0032 -3.2E-08 -3.3E-08 5.92971E-10
 Catalonia  0.032321 0.039025 0.0067 -8.8E-08 -9.6E-08 8.17033E-09
 Madrid  0.032372 0.040863 0.0085 -7.4E-08 -8.1E-08 6.94719E-09
 North  -0.04757 -0.04612 -0.0014 -2.4E-08 -2.8E-08 4.234E-09
 Centre   -0.03881 -0.02907 -0.0097 -1E-08 -1.3E-08 3.00751E-09
 Alentejo  -0.01748 -0.00788 -0.0096 -4.1E-09 -4.3E-09 1.92818E-10
Madeira   -0.00702 -0.00347 -0.0035 -1.5E-09 -1.9E-09 4.36184E-10
 Azores   -0.00633 -0.00565 -0.0007 -1.4E-09 -1.7E-09 2.62182E-10
Algarve  0.001374 0.000707 -0.0007 -2.7E-09 -3.2E-09 5.545E-10
Lisbon and the Tagus 
Valley  0.144467 0.11528 -0.0292 -3.3E-08 -3.8E-08 4.74865E-09
 
A similar trend is observed in the regions that contribute the least to GDP inequality. In 
particular, Catalonia and Madrid have increased GDP inequality the most in the Structural Fund 
era, while Basque Country, Centre, and North (regions above the national average) have 
contributed less to GDP inequality after receiving financial aid.  These regions have been getting 
closer to their respective national averages.   
 
In terms of the poorer regions, Andalucia and Comunidad Valenciana have contributed 
more to GDP inequality in the post-assistance era.  Furthermore, Catalonia and Madrid, the two 
biggest contributors to inequality (after the funds were implemented) have not received any 
financial aid under objective 1 in the post Structural Funds era (objective 1 focuses precisely on 
enhancing regional development or increasing GDP per capita to the EU average); while regions 
that have benefited the most from objective 1 – Andalucia, and Valencia – have lagged even 
further behind the national average.  In other words, the funds under objective 1 in Spain are not 
working as they were intended. It seems that the assistance funds were not able to substantially 
change the growth experiences of the most backward and advanced regions in Spain.   
Furthermore, the correlation between the final sorting and the co-payment for each region is  
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positive, which suggests that a stronger financial commitment of the regions will lead to a higher 
contribution to inequality.  On the contrary, a higher amount of resources received from Brussels 
tends to be associated with the regions decreasing inequality. 
 
When we compare the relative performance with respect to Europe we find that all 
regions in Spain did reduce their inequality since all their between Theils were negative. In 
particular, before the assistance funds were in place, the regions that were contributing the most 
to GDP inequality were Extremadura, Navarra, Cantabria, Rioja and Ceuta & Melilla. The 
regions that contributed the least to inequality during this period were Catalonia, Andalucia, the 
Basque Country, Madrid and Valencia. Once the funds were in place, the composition of regions 
that contributed the most and the least to inequality did not change over time; suggesting that not 
all regions are catching up with Europe at the same rate.  The regions that are contributing the 
most to the Spanish inequality tend to contribute the least to the European average because of 
their rapid growth experiences. On the other hand, the regions that are contributing the least in 
Spain are increasing GDP inequality with respect to Europe. Furthermore, the correlation 
between the final sorting and the co-payment for each region is positive, which suggests that a 
stronger financial commitment of the regions will lead to a higher contribution to inequality.  
Similarly, a higher amount of resources received from Brussels tends to be associated with 
regions that tend to decrease inequality. 
 
Are these trends being observed in Portugal as well? The data shows that there are some 
regions in Portugal that have experienced a reduction in GDP inequality relative to Portugal 
while other regions have experienced an increase.
18  The data show that before the assistance 
period the regions of Lisbon and the Tagus Valley, Algarve and Alentejo were the regions that 
contributed the most to GDP inequality in Portugal. In contrast, North and Centre contributed the 
least. The data also reveals that regional contribution to the Portuguese GDP inequality has 
changed within this period since the average ranking and the final rankings are not the same. The 
regional composition that contributed the most after the assistance funds have been in place did 
not change from the previously examined period. A similar trend is observed in the regions that 
contributed the least to GDP inequality. This suggests that different regions in Portugal are 
growing at different rates in terms of GDP, and the regions that were lagging behind with respect 
to Portugal are still lagging behind after the funds have been in place. It seems that the assistance 
funds have not benefited all regions.  Furthermore, the correlation between the final sorting and 
the co-payment for each region is positive, which suggests that a stronger financial commitment 
of the regions will lead to a higher contribution to inequality.  Similarly, a higher amount of 
resources received from Brussels tend to be associated with regions that tend to decrease 
inequality.  
 
If we now compare the GDP inequality with respect to Europe the data shows that all 
regions have decreased inequality since all their between Theils were negative. Moreover, before 
and after the assistance funds were in place the regions that were contributing the most to GDP 
inequality were Algarve, Madeira and Azores. The regions that contributed the least to inequality 
during this period were North, Centre and Lisbon and the Tagus Valley. The regions that are 
contributing the least are catching up with respect to Europe and the ones that are increasing 
                                                 
18 There are some regions that have positive and some negative between Theil. Thus some regions are contributing 
to greater inequality and some others are indeed reducing it.   
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inequality are lagging behind. It seems that the transfer of funds from other European nations 
through the assistance funds has been successful at reducing inequality with respect to Europe. 
This positive aspect of redistribution has not necessarily reduced regional inequality with respect 
to Portugal. This suggests that there may be some kind of agglomeration forces and increasing 
return to scale operating in Portugal. Furthermore, the correlation between the final sorting and 
the co-payment for each region is positive, which means that a stronger financial commitment of 
the regions will lead to a higher contribution to inequality.  Similarly, a higher amount of 
resources received from Brussels tends to be associated with regions that tend to decrease 
inequality. 
 
Finally, if we compare industrial and GDP inequality measures we find some common 
experiences. We recall that wage Theil is derived from wages in the 16 sectors included in 
NACE and NACE-CLIO, while GDP Theil captures the productivity of industrial and non-
industrial segments of the economy.  For the regions of Spain we find Basque Country, 
Catalonia, and Madrid have the highest national Theil components for both GDP and wages, 
while Andalucia, Galicia, Extremadura and Castilla la Mancha have the lowest Theil component 
in both indices.  In the case of Portugal, Lisboa is also the highest in both, while North and 
Centre are the lowest.  There is a group of regions however – Comunidad Valenaciana, Rioja, 
Islas Baleares, and Algarve – that have a positive GDP Theil component and a negative Theil 
wage component.  This means that the non-industrial sectors are driving the economies of this 
particular group.  On the other hand, we find Castilla & Leon with a positive wage Theil 
component but a negative GDP Theil component.  This means that in terms of wages, Castilla & 
Leon is contributing to inequality from above but in terms of GDP it is contributing from below.  
The favorable labor market conditions, in terms of wages, are not translated into the productive 
sector for this particular region. 
 
Why have regional development funds not been more helpful in reducing inequalities 
among the Iberian regions? Several explanations have been advanced in the literature. One 
possibility is that the agglomeration forces at work may be so powerful that giving a small 
advantage to a poor region will not alter the stability mechanism, see Krugman (1991) and Faini 
(1983).  A second explanation is that in Spain and Portugal the most important part of EU funds 
(40 per cent) has been used to finance new transportation infrastructures, its gap in infrastructure 
endowments with other EU members being even larger than the per capita income.  
 
An alternative possibility is that rich regions are able (through leveraging) to triple or 
quadruple the amount of regional funds allocated by the Commission in the financing of a 
particular project, see Fayolle and Lecuyer (2000) and Dall’Erba (2003). As a result, the total 
amount of investment in some rich regions may be much higher than in poor ones. Finally, the 
last potential explanation for divergence in regional economic performance may be the physical 
differences in locations, as Parker (2000) has suggested: focusing more on spatial correlations on 
performance measures of economies that share the same latitude and political system than on the 
correlation of performance measures of the economies of regions that are physically proximate.  
The physical differences in rich and poor regions of the same country may be important. 
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Challenges of the Current Funding System  
 
Even though the economic agents responsible for supplying the funds - the Council, the 
Commission, and European Parliament - benevolently try to achieve the most efficient 
mechanism to redistribute the available funds, they must unfortunately confront the fact that 
people are rational agents that respond to incentives and who in many cases, will not necessarily 
act in good faith but rather in self-interest.   
 
  A large body of literature in economics has been devoted to understand how to efficiently 
allocate limited resources when there are potential sources of asymmetry of information between 
the principal and the agent.  In our case the principle is the Council, the Commission, and 
European Parliament, and the agent is the recipient of the funds. These problems can be 
classified as moral hazard or post-contractual problems, and adverse selection or pre-contractual 
problems.  These types of asymmetries of information are indeed crucial when studying the 
Structural and Cohesion Funds.  
 
When deciding to allocate funds, the Commission often encounters a situation where one 
party cannot observe the quality of the projects of the other party.
19  This adverse selection 
problem is magnified when the future is uncertain.  In this case neither party knows what the 
other party knows.  This situation causes incentives for parties to distort what they know, thus 
differences in information held by the parties will matter.  Parties have an incentive to conceal 
negative information; therefore potential projects with a lower return could drive out projects 
with a higher return.  
 
Similarly, when allocating the funds we find situations where one party cannot observe 
the actions of the other; therefore the cost of complete contracting is prohibitive. The main cause 
of this type of problems is that one of the parties in the agreement has to make specific 
investments that are sunk. These sunk investments and sharing arrangements give rise to 
incentive conflicts. The presence of specific investments enables parties to behave 
opportunistically.
20  
 
The funds that are being redistributed across the European regions seem to suffer from 
both problems mentioned. On the one hand, the EU suffers from adverse selection since it is 
unable to recognize the good projects from the bad projects in the proposals submitted by the 
member states or regions, who might have personal interests in particular projects.
21 On the other 
hand, it also suffers from moral hazard problems. The Commission cannot adequately monitor 
the required completion of the agreed actions even thought their payment mechanisms are tied to 
the completion of actions as they are fixed in annual installments. A first installment is fixed 
following the decision to adopt a program. Subsequent installments are based on the financing 
plan and the completion of actions. The same problem applies in this case: member states or 
regions are the parties responsible of monitoring and reporting the progress of programs to the 
Commission. The monitoring agencies are given guidelines to produce assessment and 
                                                 
19 See Varian (1996) for further details.  
20 An investment is specific if it has more value in the relationship than the alternative use. 
21  Especially if there are personal gains attached to these projects.  
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evaluation reports without a third party overseeing the claims and facts of the reports.
22  Finally, 
regions eligible for funds are usually those with high inequality and ethnic polarization, which 
makes it even more likely that national and regional monitoring agencies may act in the interest 
of a particular class, ethnic group, or even on behalf of their own benefit and not in the interest of 
the region or nations.  Once the project is completed, the monitoring agencies submit a 
certificate, ‘the certificate of expenditure’, to the Commission where this report specifies how the 
funds have been spent. These reports might seem helpful at first but they are problematic since 
they do not consider potential incentives to report truthfully.   
 
 
Proposed Modifications to the Current Funding Mechanisms 
 
The debate on the forthcoming enlargement has mainly focused on implementing and managing 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Structural and Cohesion funds to the newly 
admitted Member States since most newcomers are eligible for financial aid.  In order to avoid 
the potential misuse of money, the Commission needs to reform structural policies and the CAP.  
This potential misuse could be partially avoided if the Commission establishes a truly 
independent third party that would monitor and verify the different claims in the certificate as 
well as the different reports associated with every project.  We propose a monitoring agency that 
has two separate entities. The monitoring agency would establish a reward system for the teams 
that find irregularities in the projects, specifying the penalties for falsified items in the certificate 
and establish a procedure for settling potential disputes. 
 
The main objective of the first entity would be to monitor all the projects that have been 
funded, and would be formed by different teams of all the regions that have applied for funds and 
have not initially received them. These regional teams would be in charge of verifying the claims 
in the reports and the certificate. If they find irregularities in the certificate and/or other related 
documents, they should report their findings to the second entity. The regional teams that find 
irregularities should be rewarded. In particular, the Commission should increase the likelihood of 
the team’s region of obtaining funds in the future. On the other hand, the regions that had 
falsified the claims in the certificate would not be eligible for future funds.   
 
The main objective of the second entity would be to review the findings of monitoring 
teams. This entity would also resolve any potential conflicts between the monitoring teams and 
the alleged falsified project. This entity should have members of all regions that are eligible to 
receive funds from the EU. 
 
Finally, we propose the necessity of imposing a minimum co-payment percentage for all 
funded projects in order to improve efficiency in the allocation of limited funds.  It should be 
mandatory that all projects have co-payments in order to reduce the incentives to overspend and 
misuse resources. These co-payments (by the regions) would be used to start the project while 
subsequent resources from the different funds would be given once a large fraction of co-
payment is spent.  
  
                                                 
22  Eight criteria specified in MEANS (Methods d’Evaluation des Actions de Nature Structurelle MEANS) guidance 
document Common Guide on Monitoring and Interim Evaluations.  
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Conclusions 
 
In this paper we empirically examine how different regions in Spain and Portugal have been 
affected by the structural and cohesion funds within the industrial and labor market context. In 
particular, this study addresses the following questions: (i) have these funds reduced economic 
disparities among and within the different regions of the Iberian Peninsula? and (ii) what sectors 
of the economy in the Iberian Peninsula have benefited the most?  
 
We find that wage inequality between the different regions in Spain and Portugal has 
increased after the assistance funds have been in place.  In other words, regional differences in 
wage compensation between Spain and Portugal were smaller when the Iberian Peninsula did not 
receive any assistance funds. The distribution of wages for industrial workers has become more 
unequal in the Iberian Peninsula over the past decade. Especially all regions in Spain are more 
unequal relative to themselves after being recipients of the assistance funds in terms of their 
industrial wage compensation across sectors.  Galicia, el Principado de Asturias, the Basque 
Country, Madrid, Catalonia, Balearic Islands, Andalucia and the Canary Islands have more than 
doubled their wage inequality.  Workers in these regions are thus facing the greatest wages 
differentials in Spain. A similar experience is observed in Portugal.  
 
A common trend is observed in Spain and Portugal. The industrial sectors that have 
reduced the inequality the most have been in the service industries. This overall trend in Spain 
and in Portugal may suggest how the Iberian Peninsula is slowly moving towards a service 
oriented economy. As the Iberian Peninsula becomes more integrated into the European Union, 
competition in the industrial sectors has increased. As a result of this new externally driven 
competition, less efficient sectors are growing slower.  In particular, if the service industries are 
growing at a faster rate then they will need to attract more workers by offering higher wages 
relative to other industrial sectors. The data suggests that the comparative advantage of Spain 
and Portugal is in the service industries since they are the ones that are growing the fastest. 
Assistance funds in Spain and Portugal may have been playing a catalyst role in the industrial 
and labor market transformation of the Iberian economy.  
 
At a more aggregated level GDP inequality between the different regions in Portugal has 
decreased but has increased in the case of Spain. Similarly, the contribution of other member 
states through the assistance funds, have helped reduce GDP inequality of the Iberian Peninsula 
with respect to the European average.  
 
Finally, the data suggest some sort of agglomeration forces and increasing return to scale 
operating in the Iberian Peninsula. Regions from the Iberian Peninsula with a higher GDP per 
capita tend to contribute the most in wage inequality.  Regions with lower GDP per capita tend to 
reduce inequality the most with respect to Europe. Furthermore, not all regions are catching up 
with Europe at the same rate and not all regions within the Iberian Peninsula are becoming more 
similar to each other. The fact that we can observe some asymmetries with respect to the speed 
of convergence in wages among regions suggests that the impact of the assistance funds in these 
regions may exacerbate the differences among regions. Thus regions that can potentially grow 
faster might attract more resources from other industries and from other regions and make their  
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gap even greater. As a result, the wage distribution among industrial workers within the Iberian 
Peninsula has become more unequal and skewed. 
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Appendix A - Objectives of Structural & Cohesion Funds 
 
Structural Funds 
Objective 1: 
Geared towards regions with an income below 75% of the EC average in order to promote the 
development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind. It 
encompasses four Funds: ERDF, ESA, EAGGF, and the FIFG. Beneficiary regions include all of 
Greece, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Portugal, most of Spain, the Mezzogiorno, the overseas 
departments and Corsica (in the post 1993 period the new Eastern German Lander are also 
included).   
 
Objective 2: 
Programmes are geared to converging regions that are affected by industrial decline. Its 
eligibility is linked to an unemployment rate above the community average, a percentage share 
of industrial employment exceeding the community average, and a decline in this employment 
category.   
 
Objective 3: 
Focuses on long term employment and facilitates integration into the working life of young 
people and those excluded from the labor market.  Financed by the ESF.   
 
Objective 4: 
Facilitates adaptation of workers to industrial changes and changes in the production systems.  
Draws from the ESF.  
 
Objective 5: 
Objective 5a, geared to regions in need of adjustment of their agricultural structures and 
facilitates structural adjustment of the fisheries sector. Funded by the EAGGF and FIFG.   
Objective 5b, aimed at development and structural adjustment or rural areas - eligible areas are 
those having a low level of socioeconomic development. Daws on the ERDF, the ESF, and the 
EAGGF. 
 
Objective 6: 
Geared to promote the development of regions with an extremely low population density. Draws 
from the ERDF, ESF, ERAGGF, and the FIFG. 
 
Cohesion Funds 
Operates outside of the Structural Funds. Created to support environmental and transport projects 
for these member states having a per capita less than 90% of the EU average. Recipient member 
states are Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland 
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Appendix B -  Data Sources 
 
Data to calculate the Theil statistic is drawn from two sources: ESA-79 and ESA-95.  The 
regional classification is broken down by Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 
(NUTS) at level 2.   
 
ESA 79 includes data from the years 1986-1994 and ESA-95 includes from 1995-1998 
 
Compensation data equals wages and salaries + employer’s social contributions + 
employer’s actual social contributions + employer’s imputed social contributions 
 
Sectors for ESA-79 include: Fuel and power products - Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and 
metals, other than radioactive - Non-metallic minerals and mineral products - Chemical products 
- Metal products, machinery, equipment and electrical goods - Transport equipment - Food, 
beverages, tobacco - Textiles and clothing leather and footwear - Paper and printing products - 
Products of various industries - Building and construction - Recovery, repair, trade, lodging and 
catering services - Transport and communication services -Services of credit and insurance 
institutions - Other market services - Non-market services 
 
Sectors for ESA-95 include: Agriculture, hunting and forestry – Fishing - Mining and 
quarrying – Manufacturing - Electricity, gas and water supply – Construction - Wholesale and 
retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods - Hotels and 
restaurants - Transport, storage and communication - Financial intermediation - Real estate, 
renting and business activities - Public administration and defense; compulsory social security – 
Education - Health and social work - Other community, social, personal service activities - 
Private households with employed persons. 
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Appendix C – Calculating the Theil Statistic 
 
The Theil statistic is composed of two elements a between group inequality component and a 
within group inequality component.  The sum of the two equals the total Theil thus: 
 
W B T T T + ≡         ( 1 )  
where: 
 
T= Total Theil 
= B T  Betweeen group Theil component 
W T = Within group Theil component. 
The between group component can be represented by the following two equations: 
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If we index regions with the subscript i and sectors with the subscript j then  
ij w = the total compensation received in region j and sector i  
ij e = total people employed in region j and sector i 
= i w average income of region i 
= Y w average income of all regions 
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Appendix D – Proof of equivalence between equation (2) and (2)’ 
 
We want to show: 
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